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EXTENSION OF PREMISES LIABILITY FOR
INJURIES RESULTING FROM TIE CRIMINAL ACTS
OF THIRD PARTIES ON ADJACENT LAND
I. INTRODUCTION
A man leaves a store in a shopping center after making
a purchase late one evening. While approaching his car, he is
attacked by a mugger who robs and severely injures him.
Could the store owner be liable if the man was assaulted on
a portion of the parking lot which the storeowner did not
own?' If liability was assessed against the store owner in this
scenario, he would be held to a duty of care to his custom-
ers to prevent injury from criminal acts on adjacent
property.2 This duty of care would in turn be based on the
storeowner's actual or apparent right to control the adjoining
section of the parking lot.'
© 1990 by Margaret J. Hurley.
1. There has been a steadily increasing number of cases assessing civil
liability on third parties for failing to control or prevent criminal attacks. See, e.g.,
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14 (1976) (psychotherapist's liability for violent acts of patient); O'Hara v.
Western Seven Trees Corp., 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977)
(landlord's liability for violent acts against tenants); Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified
School Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 741, 740 P.2d 360, 87 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1970) (school
district's liability for student's violent act); Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447
P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968) (state's liabilty for parolee's violent act); Vistica
v. Presbytarian Hosp. & Med. Center, 67 Cal. 2d 465, 432 P.2d 193, 62 Cal. Rptr.
577 (1967) (dicta) (hospital's lability for patient's violent acts).
2. The court, in Nevarez v. Thriftimart, Inc., 7 Cal. App. 3d 799, 803, 87
Cal. Rptr. 50, 53 (1970), had the following to say about the fundamental impor-
tance of the duty inquiry:
It is axiomatic that without a duty of care owed by the alleged
wrongdoer to the person injured, or to a class of which he is a mem-
ber no negligence can be found. Whether such a duty is owed in a
given situation is a question of law for the court to determine.
Id. at 803, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 52 (1970).
3. Nevarez, 7 Cal. App. 3d at 804, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 53 ("Though the duty of
care of the occupier of property arises from his right to control his own premis-
es, such duty may be imposed when he invites intended customers to use, in
conjunction therewith, another's property over which his right to control is, per-
haps, more apparent than actual.").
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The California Supreme Court has stressed the existence
of possession and control as a basis for tortious liability for
conditions on land.' This emphasis on possession and con-
trol has been the foundation for the assessment of liability
for injuries on the owner's land that are caused by a natural
or artificial condition of the land.5 Possession and control
also have been the basis for imposing a duty to protect
invitees on an owner's land from injury by third party crimi-
nal acts.6
However, while "mere possession with its attendant right
to control conditions on the premises is a sufficient basis for
the imposition of an affirmative duty"7 to prevent harm to
persons on the landowner's property, historically in Califor-
nia difficulties have existed in the imposition of an affirma-
tive duty on a landowner to prevent harm to persons on
adjacent land.' Because the landowner does not "possess" the
adjacent land, the courts often assume he has no right to
control it. For example, as recently as 1985, one court stated,
"[p]laintiffs have not cited nor are we aware of any case
where a landowner was held responsible for injuries to an
invitee from criminal activity occurring off the landowner's
premises ... Indeed, it is difficult to perceive how such a
rule could be fashioned."9 As will be shown, what in 1985
seemed to be an unthinkable extension of premises liability
could now be looming on the horizon.
This Comment analyzes California courts' recent treat-
ment of the question whether a landowner has a duty to
prevent injury to his invitees from criminal acts of third par-
4. Preston v. Goldman, 42 Cal. 3d 108, 119, 720 P.2d 476, 482, 227 Cal.
Rptr. 817, 823 (1986); Sprecher v. Adamson Companies, 30 Cal. 3d 358, 368, 636
P.2d 1121, 1126, 178 Cal. Rptr. 783, 788 (1981).
5. Sprecher, 30 Cal. 3d 358, 636 P.2d 1121, 178 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1981).
6. Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal. 3d 112, 695 P.2d 653, 211
Cal. Rptr. 356 (1985). In Isaacs, the California Supreme Court held that a land-
owner could be liable to people injured on his land by the criminal acts of third
parties, even without proof of prior similar incidents on the land. Id. See also infra
notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
7. Sprecher, 30 Cal. 3d at 370, 636 P.2d at 1127, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 789.
8. "The courts ... have consistently refused to recognize a duty to persons
injured in adjacent streets or parking lots over which the defendant does not have
the right of possession, management, and control." Owens v. Kings Supermarket,
198 Cal. App. 3d 379, 386, 243 Cal. Rptr. 627, 631 (1988).
9. Steinmetz v. Stockton City Chamber of Commerce, 169 Cal. App. 3d
1142, 1146, 214 Cal. Rptr. 405, 407-08 (1985).
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ties on adjacent property. Section Two traces the historical
definition of "premises" in premises liability, and a more
expansive view of the word, proposed in the case of Schwartz
v. Helms Bakery Ltd.,'0 which has recently been revived" af-
ter long being restricted to the unique facts of that particular
case." Section Three compares two court of appeal deci-
sions, one applying the more traditional concept of premis-
es, 1 3 and the other borrowing the elastic definition of pre-
mises from Schwartz, 4 which together highlight the current
tension between the two views. Section Four proposes that
the California judiciary alleviate this tension by applying the
Schwartz principle of control more liberally and hinging its
application on the existence of certain restrictive factors, so
that landowners know what areas of adjacent land for which
they are responsible.
II. BACKGROUND
It has long been held that,
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for
entry for business purposes is subject to liability to mem-
bers of the public while they are upon the land for such
a purpose, for physical harm caused by the accidental,
negligent or intentionally harmful acts of third per-
sons . . . and by the failure of the possessor to exercise
reasonable care to (a) discover that such acts are being
done or are likely to be done, or (b) give a warning
adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or
otherwise to protect them against it.'5
Although the wording of this rule contains vestiges of the
historical distinction between an invitee, a trespasser and a
licensee for the purposes of assessing liability, these status
10. 67 Cal. 2d 232, 430 P.2d 68, 60 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1967).
11. See Southland v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. App. 3d 656, 665 n.6, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 57, 61 n.6 (1988).
12. See, e.g., Steinmetz, 169 Cal. App. 3d at 1146, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 407-08.
13. Donnell v. California Western School of Law, 200 Cal. App. 3d 715, 246
Cal. Rptr. 199 (1988).
14. Southland, 203 Cal. App. 3d 656, 250 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1988).
15. Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 36 Cal. 3d 799, 807,
685 P.2d 1193, 1197, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842, 846 (1984) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 344 (1965)).
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distinctions were eliminated in Rowland v. Christian.'6
Rowland held that a landowner has a duty of reasonable care
to each person coming upon his land, regardless of that
person's status.
17
It is widely accepted today that "after Rowland, the duty
to take affirmative action for the protection of individuals
coming upon the land is grounded in the possession of the
premises and the attendant right to control and manage the
premises." 8 Thorny questions arise, however, when the
right of possession and the right of control are severed. The
fact that neither "possession" nor "control" has a clear and
consistent definition complicates the matter.
In discussing the definition of the phrase "owned or
controlled" found in California Government Code section
830(c),' 9 the court in Low v. City of Sacramento"° stated: "In
common law parlance, the possessor of land is the party
bearing responsibility for its safe condition. Possession, in
turn, is equated with occupancy plus control. Thus, in identi-
fying the party vulnerable to a verdict, control dominates
over title. 'The crucial element is control."''
"Control" is defined as the "power or authority to man-
age, direct, superintend, restrict, regulate, govern, administer,
or oversee."2 2 For the purposes of assessing premises liabili-
16. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
17. Id. at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104. In replacing the his-
torical distinctions based on the plaintiffs status with the ordinary negligence
principles of foreseeable risk and reasonable care, the California Supreme Court
stated:
The proper test to be applied to the liability of the possesssor of
land . . . is whether in the management of his property he has acted
as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others,
and, although plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee may
in the light of the facts giving rise to such status have some bearing
on the question of liability, the status is not determinative.
Id. However, the plaintiff's status as an invitee continues to be relevant to the
question of liability. See Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 36
Cal. 3d 799, 808 n.5, 685 P.2d 1193, 1198 n.5, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842, 847 n.5
(1984).
18. Sprecher v. Adamson Companies, 30 Cal. 3d 358, 368, 636 P.2d 1121,
1126, 178 Cal. Rptr. 783, 788 (1981).
19. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830(c) (West 1980).
20. 7 Cal. App. 3d 826, 87 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1970).
21. Id. at 831, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 175 (quoting Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Ltd.,
67 Cal. 2d 232, 239, 430 P.2d 68, 73, 60 Cal. Rptr. 510, 515 (1967)).
22. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 298 (5th ed. 1979).
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ty, control is equated with the power to remedy a hazardous
condition:2 3 "(I)n identifying the defendant with whom con-
trol resides, location of the power to correct the dangerous
condition is an aid."24 Thus, one can possess land without
having control over it for the purposes of premises liabil-
ity," and, more importantly for the proposition of this
Comment, can control land without possessing it.
A. Early Cases Recognized The Duty Of Care To Invitees Extends
To Adjacent Areas Within Owner's Control
It has long been the rule that a landowner can be held
liable for injuries on land adjacent to his own in certain lim-
ited circumstances. 6 The court in Johnston v. De La Guerra
Properties, Inc. 7 cited the premise that "an invitor owes a
duty to business invitees to use reasonable care as to all por-
tions of the premises over which he has control, whether
they be within the precincts of the building or on the out-
side and used by the general public in common with
invitees."28 The Johnston court applied this rule to reserve
the grant of a nonsuit29 against the plaintiff. The court held
that both the owner and tenant of a building could be liable
to a patron who was injured on a private adjacent walkway
used as an entrance to the tenant's restaurant. The fact that
the owner and tenant encouraged restaurant customers to
park their cars on the adjoining property and use the private
23. Low v. City of Sacramento, 7 Cal. App. 3d 826, 832, 87 Cal. Rptr. 173,
176 (1970).
24. Id. See also Donnell v. California Western School of Law, 200 Cal. App.
3d 715, 727, 246 Cal. Rptr. 199, 206 (1988) (Wiener, J., dissenting).
25. For example, a tenant often does not have the right to correct lighting
problems in common areas of an apartment complex; rather, this would be the
landlord's role. The court in Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment
Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970), reasoned that the landlord has a duty to
protect his tenants because he is the only one who has control of the areas of
common use and common danger in a large apartment complex, and only he has
.the power to make the necessary repairs or to provide tihe necessary protection."
Id. at 481.
26. Steinmetz v. Stockton City Chamber of Commerce, 169 Cal. App. 3d
1142, 1146, 214 Cal. Rptr. 405, 407-08 (1985).
27. 28 Cal. 2d 394, 170 P.2d 5 (1946).
28. Id. at 400, 170 P.2d at 8.
29. A nonsuit is a judgment granted against a plaintiff who fails to proceed
to trial or is unable to prove his case. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 954 (5th ed.
1979).
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walk to approach the building, and controlled the means of
lighting the walkway, was sufficient evidence to bring the
case before a jury. 0
As the Johnston decision demonstrates, a court will not
hold an adjacent landowner liable simply because he is an
adjacent landowner. Some measure of control over the situs
of the injury must exist before liability will be assessed.3 '
One such measure of control is the landowner's use of adja-
cent land for his own commercial purposes.3 2 In the case of
Kopfinger v. Grand Central Public Market,"3 the court reversed
a nonsuit in favor of the defendant market, holding that a
jury could find the market liable for injuries sustained by a
customer who slipped on a piece of gristle that had dropped
from the defendant's market onto an adjacent public side-
walk.34 Later cases have established that this "commercial
benefit" rule only applies when the landowner has the power
to correct the injury-producing condition of the adjacent
land, 5 or has caused the dangerous condition and failed to
warn customers of it.
3 6
30. Johnston, 28 Cal. 2d at 397, 170 P.2d at 7. Significant to the court's as-
sessment of liability in this case was the fact that at one time the tenant had ar-
ranged for the restaurant's patrons to park in the lot without charge, and people
doing so would use the private walkway in question to enter the restaurant. "At
the time of plaintiffs injuries, these parking arrangements had been terminated,
but, to the knowledge of both defendants, many patrons continued to park on
the adjoining property and to approach the . . . establishment from that direc-
tion." Id. at 397, 170 P.2d at 7.
31. Donnell v. California Western School of Law, 200 Cal. App. 3d 715, 246
Cal. Rptr. 199 (1988). "The law of premises liability does not extend so far as to
hold Cal Western liable merely because its property exists next to adjoining
dangerous property and it took no action to influence or affect the condition of
such adjoining property." Id. at 720, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
32. Owens v. Kings Supermarket, 198 Cal. App. 3d 379, 243 Cal. Rptr. 627
(1988).
33. 60 Cal. 2d 852, 389 P.2d 529, 37 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1964).
34. "There was evidence which, if believed, established that: as a result of the
manner of operation of Melton's stall and the market, some meat products fell to
the ground in the course of Melton's activities . . . " Id. at 856, 389 P.2d at 531,
37 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
35. See, e.g., Owens, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 385, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
36. Donnell v. California Western School of Law, 200 Cal. App. 3d 715, 721,
246 Cal. Rptr. 199, 202 (1988). The Donnell court stressed that Kopfinger was
based on the fact that the defendant's business activities affirmatively created a
dangerous condition on the adjacent public sidewalk which the defendant did not
timely remedy. Id. See also Ross v. Kirby, 251 Cal. App. 2d 267, 59 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1967).
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B. The Schwartz Decision and Its Elastic Concept of Premises
The most far-reaching assessment of liability based on
control of the dangerous condition and the power to remedy
it came in Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Ltd. 7 In Schwartz, a
four-year-old boy approached a street vendor to buy a dough-
nut. The vendor agreed to meet the boy "up the street" after
the child obtained some money from his home. After waiting
for the boy at the rendezvous point, the vendor started on
his way and the plaintiff, trying to intercept the vendor, ran
from behind a parked car into the path of an oncoming
vehicle. 8
In overruling a nonsuit in favor of the defendant, the
court held that by directing the plaintiff to an assigned meet-
ing point, the defendant established a special relationship
with the plaintiff, thereby assuming a duty to exercise due
care for his safety."9 The court held a jury could find that
because the vendor knew where the boy lived, and knew that
his directions compelled the child to cross the street against
foreseeably heavy traffic on a winter evening, the vendor
negligently discharged his duty of care by failing to stop
traffic for the plaintiff.4" In addition, the court found that a
second special relationship was forged between the defendant
vendor and the plaintiff when he invited the plaintiff to be-
come a customer of his business.4 As an invitor, the ven-
37. 67 Cal. 2d 232, 430 P.2d 68, 60 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1967). For an excellent
critique of the Schwartz decision, see Comment, The Supreme Court of California, 56
CALIF. L. REV. 1612, 1769-75 (1968).
38. Schwartz, 67 Cal. 2d at 235-36, 430 P.2d at 70-71, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 512-13.
The plaintiff filed a dismissal with prejudice as to the driver of the car, and thus
the question of her liability was not before the court. Id. at 235 n.1, 430 P.2d at
70 n.1, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 512 n.1.
39. Id. at 242, 430 P.2d at 75, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 517. The Schwartz case also
involves the issue of proximate cause and the degree of care required when
dealing with young children, but these issues stray from the proposition of this
Comment.
40. The court further pointed out that the vendor had actual knowledge of
the plaintiff's carelessness in traffic, which pushed the vendor's standard of care
for the plaintiff even higher than that due to a stranger. Schwartz, 67 Cal. 2d at
243, 430 P.2d at 75-76, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 517-18.
41. Id. at 236, 430 P.2d at 70, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 512. The court's finding of a
proprietor-invitee relationship thus raised the long-established duty of a proprietor
to exercise reasonable care for the welfare of his business invitees. See, e.g., Peter-
son v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 36 Cal. 3d 799, 807, 685 P.2d
1990]
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dor could be held to the duty of exercising reasonable care
for the child's safety in the immediate vicinity of the
truck." Thus, a jury could find that the vendor should have
supervised the plaintiff during his trip to and from his
house.4
3
The key portion of the Schwartz decision is the court's
analysis of the meaning of "premises." After first stating the
general rule that one who invites another to transact business
with him owes to the invitee a duty to prevent injury to
him,44 the court stated:
The physical area encompassed by the term "the premis-
es" does not, however, coincide with the area to which
the invitor possesses a title or a lease. The "premises"
may be less or greater than the invitor's property. The
premises may include such means of ingress and egress
as a customer may reasonably be expected to use. The
crucial element is control.45
In a later footnote the court described the limits to this ex-
tension of the "premises" definition:
The authorities we have cited above show that the con-
cept of "business premises" may no longer be mechani-
cally defined by the geographical area in which the invi-
tor holds a property interest. An invitor may be liable
for an injury, whether it occurs on his property or on a
common passageway or on an adjacent sidewalk or street
being used for his special benefit, if, and only if, the
injury is caused by a dangerous condition, or unreason-
able risk of harm, within the invitor's control.
4 6
1193, 1197, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842, 846 (1984).
42. Schwaitz, 67 Cal. 2d at 24243, 430 P.2d at 75, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 517. The
court held that the public streets and sidewalks were included as part of the
vendor's business premises because they had become an integral part of the
vendor's business activities. Id. at 243 n.10, 430 P.2d at 75 n.10, 60 Cal. Rptr. at
517 n.10.
43. Id. at 242, 430 P.2d at 75, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 517. See also supra note 40
and accompanying text.
44. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
45. Schwartz, 67 Cal. 2d at 239, 430 P.2d at 72-73, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 514-15.
This formulation will hereafter be referred to as the Schwartz definition of premis-
es.
46. Schwartz, 67 Cal. 2d at 243 n.10, 430 P.2d at 75 n.10, 60 Cal. Rptr. at
517 n.10.
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Thus, the Schwartz court chose to apply the general common
law principles of landowner liability to this street vendor,
4 7
even though he owned no land in the area, because he un-
dertook to control the child's actions and could have stopped
the traffic while the boy crossed the street.48
C. The Impact of the Schwartz Definition of "Premises"
Many recent courts have limited the elastic Schwartz defi-
nition of premises to the facts of that case.49 In Nevarez v.
Thriftimart, Inc.,"° the court considered the liability of a gro-
cery store for injuries sustained by the three-year-old
plaintiff" when, attracted to a grand-opening carnival in the
store's parking lot, he ran into a public street and was struck
by an automobile driven by a third party. The Nevarez court
stated that the foundation for the Schwartz decision, that the
vendor undertook a special relationship with the child by
inviting him to do business with the vendor at a certain
place, was unrelated to the case before it and "founded upon
distinctions not here present."5" Viewing Schwartz as a
unique decision, the court reasoned that the Schwartz holding
47. The Schwartz court first characterized the vendor-child relationship as a
proprietor-invitee relationship historically recognized at common law, and then
specifically stated that it was creating no new duty but merely recognizing the
common law duty arising from the relationship between the parties. Id. at 239
n.4, 430 P.2d 68, 72 n.4, 60 Cal. Rptr. 510, 514 n.4.
48. Id. at 243, 430 P.2d at 75, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 517. It is interesting to note
that many later courts failed to recognize that the Schwartz holding was in part
based on the street vendor's ability to "[halt] the automobiles to enable the child
to cross safely," id., and thus control the traffic around him. See, e.g., Nevarez v.
Thriftimart, Inc., 7 Cal. App. 3d 799, 805, 87 Cal. Rptr. 50, 54 (1970) ("While the
street vendor cannot control traffic on the street around him he can, to a degree,
control his own movements, the places where lie will do business, and, thus, the
avenues of approach to it.").
49. See, e.g., Nevarez, 7 Cal. App. 3d at 805, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 54. But see, Low
v. City of Sacramento, 7 Cal. App. 3d 826, 831, 87 Cal. Rptr. 173, 175 (1970)
(borrowing the Schwartz distinction between control and title).
50. 7 Cal. App. 3d 799, 87 Cal. Rptr. 50 (1970).
51. The plaintiff's action was brought by his guardian ad litem on his behalf.
Id. at 799.
52. Id. at 805, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 54. The Nevarez court saw the foundation for
the Schwartz decision as finding that the vendor undertook a special relationship
with the child by inviting him to do business with the vendor at a certain place:
"[T]he street vendor is present in the street with his truck; he invites people to
do business with him at his truck and in that part of the public street around
him; patrons are attracted from predictable groups and locations, arriving along
reasonably predictable routes of approach." Id.
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was grounded in the vendor's power to choose the area
where he did business and, thus, the avenues of approach to
that area.53 The court stressed that the grocery store could
not control the surrounding public streets and could not
control the unlimited routes of approach which children
might take to reach the store.54 To support this point, the
court reasoned that if liability were to be assessed in such a
case, "[r]etail establishments would be cast in the role of a
modern-day Pied Piper and, as such, obligated to act as par-
ent or babysitter for every tot in the neighborhood who
might decide to dash across a public street in order to bask
in the store's allure."55
Litigants have attempted to extend the use of the
Schwartz definition of premises to civil suits arising out of
injuries from criminal attacks. In Isaacs v. Huntington Memori-
al Hospital,56 the California Supreme Court established that
a landowner could be held liable to people injured on his
premises by the criminal acts of third parties even though
there had been no similar incidents of criminal activity on
his land in the past.57 Not surprisingly, a series of cases fol-
lowed attempting to extend such landowner liability to inju-
ries occurring on adjacent land.
In Steinmetz v. Stockton City Chamber of Commerce,58 the
plaintiffs' decedent was murdered after attending a social
mixer sponsored by the defendant Chamber of Commerce
["Chamber"]. On the night of the murder, the mixer was
53. Id.
54. Nevarez, 7 Cal. App. 3d at 805-06, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 53-54. In contrast to
roving street vendors, the court reasoned, the defendant had no way of knowing
which routes children would use to attend the carnival. Id. at 806, 87 Cal. Rptr.
at 54.
55. Id.
56. 38 Cal. 3d 112, 695 P.2d 653, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1985).
57. Id. at 127, 695 P.2d at 659, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 362. Before the Isaacs deci-
sion, several appellate court decisions had adopted the rule that "in the absence
of prior similar incidents, an owner of land is not bound to anticipate the crimi-
nal activities of third persons, particularly where the wrongdoer was a complete
stranger to both the landowner and the victim and where the criminal activity
leading to the injury came precipitously." Wingard v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 123
Cal. App. 3d 37, 43, 176 Cal. Rptr. 320, 324 (1981). In Isaacs, however, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court criticized the "prior incidents rule" and adopted, in the
alternative, the much broader test of foreseeability. The court advised that "[p]rior
similar incidents are helpful to determine foreseeability but they are not neces-
sary." Isaacs, 38 Cal. 3d at 127, 695 P.2d at 659, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
58. 169 Cal. App. 3d 1142, 214 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1985).
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hosted by the defendant California Human Development
Corporation ["CHDC"] at its offices in an industrial park.
Because CHDC had only 20-25 parking spaces within its pre-
mises, the party-goers parked in other businesses' parking
areas within the industrial park. When returning to her car
parked in a section of the lot about one block away from
CHDC premises, but still within the industrial park, the dece-
dent was killed. The plaintiffs for the decedent alleged the
defendants breached their duty to the decedent as their busi-
ness invitee in failing to provide a safe place to park because
the inadequate lighting and lack of security guards in the
industrial park's lot contributed to her death."9
In upholding a grant of summary judgment in favor of
both defendants, the court of appeals discussed the Schwartz
definition of premises but distinguished it, stating:
This elastic concept of business premises is uniquely
appropriate to the vendor whose commercial activities
are conducted from a mobile vehicle at shifting locations
on the public streets. However, we know of no decision
which has applied this standard to one whose business is
conducted on private property in a fixed location. In-
deed, it is difficult to perceive how such a rule could be
fashioned.'
Because, as the court pointed out, the duty to protect indi-
viduals is always grounded on the right to control and man-
age the premises,' the court easily determined that on the
facts before it the plaintiffs had not established the existence
of a duty of care: "[t]he decedent was murdered off the pre-
mises leased by CHDC on property not within the possession
or control of CHDC or Chamber, but rather on the premises
of another tenant in the industrial park."6" Moreover, nei-
ther defendant had the right to station security guards, install
lighting, or control the conduct of invitees or third parties
on the other sections of the industrial park lot outside of
59. Id. at 1144, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
60. Id. at 1146, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
61. Id. (quoting Sprecher v. Adarnson Companies, 30 Cal. 3d 358, 368, 636
P.2d 1121, 1126, 178 Cal. Rptr. 783, 788 (1981)).
62. Steinmetz, 169 Cal. App. 3d at 1146, 214 Cal. Rpir. at 407.
1990]
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CHDC's.6" Thus, the court determined that neither defen-
dant owed the decedent a duty of care.
The court in Owens v. Kings Supermarket64 joined with
the Nevarez and Steinmetz courts in limiting the Schwartz defi-
nition of premises to the unique facts of the Schwartz case.
In Owens, the plaintiff double-parked his car on a public
street in front of the defendant supermarket. He was injured
when another car rolled forward and crushed his legs while
he was exiting his car. 63 After two demurrers were sustained
against his original and first amended complaints, the plain-
tiff finally alleged that the accident occurred on the super-
market "premises."66 However, because the plaintiff did not
explain the sudden change in the alleged location of the
accident, the court assumed the plaintiff was injured on a
public street adjacent to the defendant's property, as had
been alleged in the previous two complaints. 67
63. Id. at 1147, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 408. In an oft-quoted passage the court
described the ominous consequences of extending a landowner's duty to land not
owned or controlled by him. "The instant case cannot be distinguished from that
of a movie theater showing the latest Academy Award winning movie, or a depart-
ment store holding its annual clearance sale, neither of which is able to afford
sufficient parking for the number of invitees seeking to enter the premises." Id.
64. 198 Cal. App. 3d 379, 243 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1988).
65. Id. at 381-82, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
66. In the plaintiff's original complaint, he alleged that the defendant su-
permarket used the roadway adjacent to its premises, where plaintiff was injured,
as a parking lot for its customers. The defendant's demurrer to this complaint
was sustained with leave to amend, on the ground that the defendant had no
power to control the public street. Id. at 382, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 629. The first
amended complaint added a new paragraph alleging the sidewalk and adjacent
roadway were used for the commercial benefit of the defendant for deliveries and
customer parking, and that this commercial use created a hazardous condition
which caused his injuries. In support of its second demurrer, the defendant
argued that it had no duty to persons injured off its premises by an alleged dan-
gerous condition of an adjacent public street. The court also sustained this demur-
rer with leave to amend. Id. at 382-83, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 629. Finally in his second
amended complaint the plaintiff alleged he was on the defendant's premises when
he was injured. Id.
67. Owens, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 383-84, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 630. The court
based its assumption on the rule that:
where a party files an amended complaint and seeks to avoid the de-
fects of a prior complaint either by omitting the facts that rendered
the complaint defective or by pleading facts inconsistent with the al-
legations of prior pleadings, the policy against sham pleadings permits
the court to take judicial notice of the prior pleadings and requires
that the pleader explain the inconsistency. If he fails to do so the
court may disregard the inconsistent allegations and read into the
amended complaint the allegations of the superseded complaint.
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The court rejected the plaintiff's two theories of liability
on the basis that the supermarket could not control nor
manage the public street adjacent to its entrance."8 The
court reasoned:
Thus, although it is indisputable that the scope of pre-
mises liability has been greatly expanded in the last 10
years, plaintiff is attempting to extend the duty bcyond
the premises and into an undefined zone of "commercial
use." The imposition of such a duty is foreign to the
concept upon which all premises liability is based, i.e.,
that possession includes the attendant right to manage
and control, thereby justifying the imposition of a duty
to exercise due care in the management of the proper-
ty.
6 9
Schwartz was cited as a "very narrow exception to the general
rule that a person has no duty to exercise ordinary care to
render safe property over which he or she has no right of
possession or control."70 However, relying on the Steinmetz
and Nevarez decisions, the court declined to extend the duty
recognized in Schwartz to a commercial enterprise operating
out of a fixed location. 71
The reluctance to extend the Schwartz definition of pre-
mises has not been limited to courts faced with commercial
defendants. In Donnell v. California Western School of Law,72
Id. [Citations omitted].
68. Id. at 385, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 630-31. After asserting the accident took
place on the defendant's premises, the plaintiff utilized the traditional arguments
for the imposition of landowner liability. The plaintiff first relied on the Sprecher
principle that a landowner has the duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent
injuries to persons on adjacent property caused by a natural or artificial condition
of the owner's property. Second, the plaintiff invoked the Isaacs rule that a land-
owner is liable to an invitee for foreseeable injuries caused by the harmful acts of
third parties. Id.
69. Id. at 386, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 631. "The courts, therefore, have consistently
refused to recognize a duty to persons injured in adjacent streets or parking lots
over which the defendant does not have the right of possession, management and
control." Owens, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 386, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
70. Id. at 387, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 632. As has been noted, this characterization
of Schwartz as an exception to the general rule is not entirely correct. See supra
note 48 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 50-55, 58-63 and accompanying text.
72. 200 Cal. App. 3d 715, 246 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1988). In Donnel4 a law stu-
dent left the law library at approximately 10:30 p.m. and, while walking. to the
parking lot, noticed a man trying to break into someone else's car. The assailant
chased him when the student tried to intervene, and stabbed him while he was
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the court refused to hold the defendant law school liable to
the plaintiff for a criminal assault on a poorly lit public side-
walk immediately adjacent to the law school. The court first
noted that the plaintiffs heavy reliance on Schwartz was "mis-
placed" because even in Schwartz the premises definition was
based on control of the property," and no evidence existed
of the law school's right of control over the public sidewalk.
The court then dismissed the plaintiff's argument that by
placing lights on its building the school could have illuminat-
ed the area and reduced the probability of such an attack:
"The mere possibility of influencing or affecting the condi-
tion of the property owned or possessed by others does not
constitute 'control' of such property."74 The Donnell deci-
sion, thus, soundly rejects the Schwartz elastic definition of
premises by stating that the "language in Schwartz did not
expand the law of premises liability beyond those premises
owned, possessed or controlled by the defendant.""
The application of Schwartz remained limited, until the
recent case of Southland v. Superior Court.71 In Southland, the
petitioners, Southland Corporation and Jan Lee, Inc., sought
writ relief compelling the respondent Superior Court to
grant their motion for summary judgment.7" The real party
in interest, Spencer (the plaintiff in the underlying action),
had parked his car on a vacant lot immediately adjacent to
the parking lot provided for a 7-Eleven store owned by
Southland Corporation. He was attacked while returning to
his car after making a purchase at the store, at a spot ap-
proximately ten feet beyond the boundary of the property
leased to the store.7 8 His assailants, described as dressed
on a public sidewalk. Id. at 718, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
73. Id. at 722-23, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 203. This control in Schwailz was, among
other things, the vendor's ability to halt traffic around him to allow the boy to
move safely into the street. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
74. Id. at 725-26, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
75. Id. at 722, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 203. Tie Donnell court further explained that
"such language was merely part of the [Schwatiz] court's summary of the earlier
cases involving premises liability." Id.
76. 203 Cal. App. 3d 656, 250 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1988).
77. Id. at 662, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 59. The petitioners brought a writ of man-
date, which is "[a] precept or order issued upon the decision of an appeal or writ
of error, directing action be taken, or disposition to be made of a case, by [tie]
inferior court." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 867 (5th ed. 1979).
78. Spencer settled his action against tise owner of the vacant lot. Southland
v. Superior Ct., 203 Cal. App. 3d 656, 662 n.4, 250 Cal. Rptr. 57, 59 n.4 (1988).
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like a "punk rock trio," approached him from behind, which
was from the direction of the 7-Eleven.79 Spencer filed a
complaint for negligence against Southland, as franchisor of
the 7-Eleven, and Lee, as franchisee of the store, among
others.80
The fact pattern of Southland seems very susceptible to
the Steinmetz court's narrow reading of the Schwartz deci-
sion."1 However, after noting that previous decisions had
limited the Schwartz holding to the unique facts of that
case," the Southland court explained, " . . . what is signifi-
cant about Schwartz, in the context of this case, is its elastic
concept of control. The opinion emphasizes that the critical
issue is control but recognizes that the exercise of control is
not necessarily confined to those premises which are owned
or possessed by the defendant."" The court distinguished
the line of cases (Steinmetz, Nevarez, Owens, and Donnell)
where "it was clear that the defendant did not and could not
exercise control over the property where plaintiff sustained
injury, 8.4 and upheld the denial of summary judgment for
the petitioners on the basis that they had the "power" to
control the adjacent lot. 5 Revitalizing the Low court's view
of "control,"8 6 the court reasoned, "it is overly simplistic for
the issue of control to be resolved solely by reference to a
property boundary line and the fortuitous circumstances that
the attack on [the plaintiff] took place just ten feet beyond it."8"
The very argument the Donnell court rejected, that a
landowner's possibility of affecting the condition of adjacent
79. Id. at 660, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 58.
80. Id. at 662, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 59. The defendant Southland leased the
premises from an entity not a party to the action and subleased them to the
defendant Lee, its franchisee. Id. at 662 n.3, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 59 n.3.
81. Steinmetz v. Stockton City Chamber of Commerce, 169 Cal. App. 3d
1142, 1146, 214 Cal. Rptr. 405, 408 (1985) (stating that no decision had as yet
applied the Schwatz definition of premises to one whose business was conducted
on private property in a fixed location).
82. Southland, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 665 n.6, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 61 n.6.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 665-66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
85. Id. at 666, 250 Cal..Rptr. at 62.
86. Low v. City of Sacramento, 7 Cal. App. 3d 826, 831, 87 Cal. Rptr. 173,
175 (1970), where the court reasoned that "in identifying the party vulnerable to a
verdict, control dominates over title." See also supra notes 20-24 and accompanying
text.
87. Southland, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 667, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 63.
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property was sufficient to show "control" over it,88 was re-
phrased in Southland as the "power to control"89 and accept-
ed as sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact over the
defendant's control of the adjacent lot. Can this difference
be passed off as merely reflecting the different fact patterns
of the two cases? A more detailed analysis of Donnell and
Southland is necessary to answer this question.
III. DONNELL AND SOUTIILAND - IS THE "ABILITY TO
CONTROL" A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR LIABILITY?
The facts of the Donnell and Southland decisions are sur-
prisingly similar, given the opposite results the two courts
reach. Noteworthy is that in both decisions, the court was
reviewing the order on a summary judgment motion at the
trial court level. While not a final assessment of liability, a
court's decision at the summary judgment stage can
significantly affect settlement negotiations between the par-
ties.9" In addition, an order of summary judgment in favor
of the defendant takes the case from a jury, thereby usurping
the jury's role of determining both what happened and
whether the defendant exercised ordinary care in his ac-
tions.9'
In both Donnell and Southland the plaintiff was injured
by a third party while returning to his car from the defend-
ant's establishment." The allegations of the defendant's lia-
88. Donnell v. California Western School of Law, 200 Cal. App. 3d 715,
725-26, 246 Cal. Rptr. 199, 205 (1988).
89. Southland, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 664, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
90. Subsequent to the court's reversal of a summary judgment order in favor
of the defendant in Gomez v. Ticor, 145 Cal. App. 3d 622, 193 Cal. Rptr. 600
(1983), the defendant, Ticor, paid $150,000 in settlement. Similarly, after the court
overruled a summary judgment order in the defendant's favor in Cohen v.
Southland Corp., 157 Cal. App. 3d 130, 203 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1984), the plaintiff
entered into a structured settlement with the defendants for an undisclosed
amount. Cabrera, Negligence Liability of Landowners and Occupiers for the Criminal
Conduct of Another: On a Clear Day in California One Can Foresee Foever, 23 CAL.
W.L. REV. 165, 182 n.100, 183 n.104 (1987).
91. One commentator explains: "Under the broadly defined negligence stan-
dard, the jury is needed not only to determine what conduct actually occurred,
but to characterize that conduct according to the 'ordinary care' test. Thus, the
jury will generally be needed even when the facts are not materially disputed."
Leonard, The Good Samaritan Rule as a Procedural Control Device: Is It Woalh Sav-
ing?, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 807, 816 (1986).
92. Donnell, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 718, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 200; Southland, 203
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bility were identical: both plaintiffs alleged that the defendant
failed to provide adequate parking for their invitees." Both
also alleged that, considering the defendant's knowledge of
criminal activity in the area, the defendant was negligent in
not installing sufficient security measures to prevent their
injuries. 4 However, one crucial distinction exists in the facts
of the cases: the attack in Donnell occurred on a public side-
walk, 5 whereas the assault in Southland happened on a
privately-owned, vacant lot which the defendants had a
non-exclusive leasehold right to use for customer parking. 6
While the Southland court had no trouble distinguishing
Donnell based on its factual distinction, 7 the public nature
of the situs of the injury in Donnell did not justify the
Donnell court's decision.
A. The Donnell Decision Unduly Restricts The Scope Of The Law
School's Premises
Because adult students are generally considered business
invitees,98 the Donnell court recognized that the proper anal-
ysis under the facts of the case was whether the defendant
law school, a proprietor, had a duty to prevent this injury to
the plaintiff, a business invitee."9 However, instead of utiliz-
ing the policy factors enunciated in Rowland to determine
whether a duty existed, the court seized on the Isaacs state-
Cal. App. 3d at 660, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 58.
93. Donnell, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 718, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 200; Southland, 203
Cal. App. 3d at 661, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 59.
94. Donnell, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 718, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 200; Southland, 203
Cal. App. 3d at 664-65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
95. Donnell, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 718, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 200. At the trial level,
Donnell had presented evidence that the assailant chased him and eventually
slashed at him while his back was against a garbage dumpster at the Northwest
corner of Cal Western's law school buildiig. However, this point was not raised
in the appellate brief as a basis for liability, and the appellate court dismissed it
in a footnote. See id. at 718 n.1, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 200 n.1.
96. Southland, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 661, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 58. "Petitioners,
under the master lease, had a non.exclusive right to use two portions of the vacant
lot for the ingress and egress of their employees and customers and apparently
also had a non-exclusive right to use the adjacent lot for extra parking." Id. at 661
nI, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 58 n.1 (emphasis original).
97. Id. at 667, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 63.
98. Donnell, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 719, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 201 ("Mature students
are generally considered business invitees.").
99. Id. at 720, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 201. See also supra note 15 and accompany-
ing text.
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ment that "[a] defendant cannot be held liable for the defec-
tive or dangerous condition of property which it [does] not
own, possess, or control. Where the absence of ownership,
possession or control has been unequivocally established,
summary judgment is proper."'00 Because the law school's
lack of ownership and possession of the city-owned sidewalk
was automatically established, only the element of "control"
had to be eliminated for the court to properly enter summa-
ry judgment for the defendant based on Isaacs.'0 ' The
court did this by adopting a restrictive definition of control
and ignoring the application of the Rowland policy consider-
ations to the facts of the case.'02
The fact that the attack in Donnell occurred on a public
sidewalk made a comparison to the Steinmetz decision0 3 in-
evitable. The Donnell court believed that both cases involved
an injury on land over which the defendant had no right of
control. 0 4 However, whereas in Steinmetz the location of
the attack was far from the defendant's premises, thus pre-
cluding the defendant's ability to affect the situs of the inju-
ry, ' 5 in Donnel4 the attack occurred at the west side of the
defendant's building. 6 This gave the plaintiff a strong ar-
gument that the defendant, knowing of prior criminal attacks
in this locality, should have placed lights on its building to
shine over the sidewalk, or mounted exterior monitors on its
100. Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital, 38 Cal. 3d 112, 134, 695 P.2d
653, 664, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356, 367 (1985).
101. Id.
102. See infra notes 103-10, 126-36 and accompanying text.
103. Steinmetz v. Stockton City Chamber of Commerce, 169 Cal. App. 3d
1142, 214 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1085).
104. Donnell v. California Western School of Law, 200 Cal. App. 3d 715, 725,
246 Cal. Rptr. 199, 205 (1988). Tihe court stated: "Here Donnell has presented no
evidence Cal Western had any right to control or manage the city-owned side-
walk." Id.
105. Steinmetz, 169 Cal. App. 3d at 1147, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 409. The court
emphasized:
CHDC had no right to station security guards on premises it neither
owned nor controlled. Nor did CIHDC have any right to place light-
ing in any parking area other than its own parking area. Moreover,
neither CFIDC nor Chamber had any right to control the activities of
either the invitees or third parties where those activities occur off
premises which they neither own, possess, nor control.
Id.
106. Donnell, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 717, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
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building, so that students could view the area before cross-
ing. 0
7
The court rejected the plaintiffs argument that the
defendant's failure to install these safety measures proximate-
ly caused his injuries.' The weakness of the court's rea-
soning surfaces more readily in a similar statement later in
the case:'
Unlike the plaintiff in Johnston, Donnell presented no
evidence Cal Western had any right to control the
city-owned 'sidewalk where Donnell was assertedly injured.
At most, Clil Western merely had the ability to influence
or affect the condition of the city's property. Further,
Donnell presented no evidence Cal Western assumed any
responsibility for or exercised control over the means of
lighting the city-owned sidewalk where Donnell was in-
jured. 9
The court's reasoning is not consistent with the factual
evidence and allegations of liability Donnell presented. The
proof of "control" needed to support liability is proof of the
power to correct the dangerous condition of land."0 The
dangerous condition of the sidewalk where Donnell was as-
saulted was its darkness. Cal Western had the ability to dispel
this darkness by installing lights on its building. Cal Western
had the right to control the sidewalk in this way because it
had the right to install anything it wanted on a building it
owned."'
In view of this showing of control over the adjacent side-
walk, the court could only assert that "[d]epending on loca-
tion, building configurations and technology, Cal Western
may have the potential to influence or affect the condition of
107. Id. at 720, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
108. 'Id. As its basis for this rejection, the court explained: "Donnell attempts
to expand the principle of 'control' of property to include situations where an
adjoining landowner merely has the ability to influence or affect such property."
Id.
109. Id. at 722, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
110. See DonneU, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 727 n.1, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 206 n.1(Weiner, J., dissenting) ("'Control' means '[t]o exercise authority or dominating
influence over; direct; regulate.' (THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 290 (New College ed. 1981)) 'Influence' is '[t]o have power
over; affect.' (Id. at 674)").
111. Id. at 728, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 207 (Weiner, J., dissenting). In fact, the law
school did install such lighting shortly after the assault on Donnell. Id.
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adjoining property or property at various distances from its
own property."". This argument has surface appeal be-
cause of the fear of subjecting an entity to potentially unlim-
ited liability. However, this fear exists in every negligence
case. For example, if Donnell had been assaulted within Cal
Western's property lines, Cal Western may have been held
liable for not illuminating and having security guards patrol
the area.'13 The question would then be to what degree of
care should Cal Western be held, e.g., should it have had a
security guard patrol every hour, or every half hour? Cal
Western would be held to the standard of care a reasonable
entity would exercise in the same circumstances. Similarly,
even if Cal Western had the technology to illuminate the
sidewalk a block away, it would only reasonably be expected
that the school would illuminate the immediate vicinity. As
the dissenting judge put it:
[W]e could not expect Cal Western to fix the sidewalk
adjacent to buildings two blocks away from the law
school entrance even though students routinely use those
sidewalks. 'Control' in that situation is nothing more
than a conclusionary way of saying that we do not im-
pose impossible burdens on people."4
This limitation was also in the minds of the members of the
Schwartz court when they originally formulated their flexible
definition of premises:
Obviously, defendants are not insurers for all accidents
occurring in areas through which their truck passes. They
may not be held liable, for example, for a fall caused by
an unobserved defect in a sidewalk next to which their
truck stops. They may be responsible, however, for harm
occurring in the immediate vicinity of the truck, wherev-
er it may be stopped at a given time, if the harm is of a
kind that defendants could have prevented by exercising
reasonable care for the safety of their customers. "
112. Id. at 725, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
113. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
114. DonneU, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 728, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 206-07 (Weiner, J.,
dissenting).
115. Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Ltd., 67 Cal. 2d 232, 243 n.10, 430 P.2d 68,
75 n.10, 60 Cal. Rptr. 510, 517 n. 10 (1967).
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This kind of reasonable care standard delineates the bound-
aries of all defendants' liability. The Donnell court should
have left it to future courts to deal with the scope of the
physical limits of control in the close cases.
The Donnell court essentially stated that its decision rest-
ed on the fine distinction between the "right to control"
property and the "ability to influence or affect the condition
of" that property, but it never explained what it saw as the
difference in meaning between the two. The dictionary defi-
nitions of these terms are almost identical." 6 The court left
a puzzling question unanswered: how will a landowner be
able to distinguish between the terms? Because judicial deci-
sions often influence public conduct with respect to avoiding
liability, the Donnell court should riot have based its decision
on murky linguistic comparisons." 7
Moreover, the court's definition of "control," which ex-
cludes the idea of ability to influence or affect the condition
of property, departs from the California courts' long-standing
interpretation of the word."' Courts have often been reluc-
tant to extend liability to a defendant who lacks the ability to
repair the dangerous condition."9 By analogy, if the power
to influence the condition of property has been established,
as it was in Donnell, liability should follow. For example, in
assessing liabilty between a landlord and a tenant, a court
examines which party had the right to influence or control
the dangerous locality. ° As the court in Low v. City of Sac-
ramento, stated:
116. See supra note 110.
117. "Given the wide ranging circumstances that may exist in cases involving
landowners and occupiers and the analytical complexity in determining which set-
ting justifies a protective duty, there is clearly a definite need for better guidance
than that presently offered by the judiciary." Cabrera, supra note 90, at 185.
118. See, e.g., Johnston v. De La Guerra Properties, Inc., 28 Cal. 2d 394, 401,
170 P.2d 5, 9 (1946) ("This evidence would support a finding and conclusion that
Smith had a limited right of control over this portion of tile premises and of the
means of illuminating the entranceway . . . ").
119. In Nevarez v. Thriftimart, Inc., 7 Cal. App. 3d 799, 805, 87 Cal. Rptr. 50,
53 (1970), the court noted that the defendant supermarket could not be held
liable for injuries occurring in a public street because the power to control public
streets and regulate traffic lies with the state which may delegate local authority to
municipalities.
120. Low v. City of Sacramento, 7 Cal. App. 3d 826, 832, 87 Cal. Rptr. 173,
175 (1970).
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Although authority to remedy the dangerous condition is
no longer an express statutory standard, the courts have
continued to resort to it. Where control, rather than
power to correct the defective condition, is the verbal
signal of liability, the courts have continued to equate
the two concepts. Thus, in identifying the defendant with
whom control resides, location of the power to correct
the dangerous condition is an aid.'
Interestingly, the definition of control above was used by
both Schwartz and the modern line of cases which refused to
adopt the Schwartz flexible concept of premises. One of the
bases for the Schwartz court's decision was the vendor's abili-
ty to halt traffic to allow the child to cross safely and, thus,
remedy the dangerous condition. 2 In Nevarez, 25 the
court refused to recognize the defendant grocery store could
be liable because "[t]he power to control public streets and
regulate traffic lies with the state which may delegate local
authority to municipalities." 4 The Owens court explained
that the concept upon which all premises liability is based is
the right to manage and control property, which justifies the
imposition of a duty to exercise due care in the management
of the property.'2 5 Clearly, California precedent establishes
that liability is not justified unless the defendant had the
power to prevent the injury.
The Donnell decision contains a more fundamental flaw
by ignoring the consideration of the relevant policy factors in
assessing the existence of a duty between the law school and
its students. 12  Any judicial departure from the legislative
principle expressed in California Civil Code section 1714,127
requires an evaluation of the Rowland policy considerations:
[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree
of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the close-
121. Id. at 832, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
122. See supra note 49 arid accompanying text.
123. Navarez, 7 Cal. App. 3d 799, 87 Cal. Rptr. 50 (1970).
124. Id. at 805, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
125. Owens v. Kings Supermarket, 198 Cal. App. 3d 379, 386, 243 Cal. Rptr.
627, 631 (1988).
126. The only policy consideration discussed by the, court was the burden to
the defendant. Donnell v. California Western School of Law, 200 Cal. App. 3d
715, 725, 246 Cal. Rptr. 199, 205 (1988).
127. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1985).
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ness'of the connection between the defendant's conduct
and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the
defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future
harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to
exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the
availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk
involved. 128
Possibly the court ignored the Rowland factors because
their application to the facts of Donnell practically mandates
the recognition of a duty.'2 9 The plaintiff alleged, and sup-
ported his allegations with proof, that the defendant had
knowledge of other attacks in this location.13 0 The
plaintiff's allegations of injury were not disputed. 1 Com-
mon knowledge dictates that more muggings occur in dark
places. Therefore, one could reasonably assume that the
defendant's failure to install adequate lighting was connected
to the plaintiff's injuries. 13 The policy of preventing future
harm would be served by imposing liability on the defendant
for not adequately protecting its students from injury is indis-
putable. As for the burden to the defendant, the safety mea-
sures could be installed at a low cost, and insurance is widely
available for this type of injury.'33 In addition, because Cal
Western is a private school, there was no public entity discre-
tionary immunity to contend with.
As for the moral blame attached to the defendant's con-
duct, the dissenting judge summed it up best:
[I]t is perhaps an indictment of our litigation-minded
society that a law school repeatedly rejected its
employees' and students' requests for increased lighting
and other security measures in the face of known risk of
criminal assault because of nominal expense and the
danger the school would be assuming liability if lights
were installed." 4
128. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, -113, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 100 (1968).
129. 200 Cal. App. 3d at 727, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 206 (Weiner, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 727, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 206.
131. Donnell v. California Western School of Law, 200 Cal. App. 3d 715, 727
246 Cal. Rptr. 199, 206 (1988) (Weiner, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 727, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 206. '
133. However, this coverage question would most likely be governed by the
definition of "premises" in the particular policy.
134. Donnell, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 727,'246 Cal. Rptr. at 206 (Weiner, J., dis-
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The Donnell court rewarded this inaction by refusing to hold
the school liable "precisely because it did not assume respon-
sibility over the city-owned sidewalk."" 5 The court indulged
Cal Western even though the school most likely could have
prevented the attack by installing adequate lighting. The
decision ignores the facts and fails to address the policy con-
siderations required in the determination of the duty of care.
The court disregarded the facts and policy considerations in
favor of overzealous protection of the "predictability and
reasonably clear limits" that "[t]he existing standard for pre-
mises liability" furnishes.'36 Unfortunately, the Southland deci-
sion did little to remedy the Donnell court's mistake.
B. Southland: A Missed Opportunity To Clarify The Definitions
Of "Control" And "Premises"
The Southland court focused on certain of the real
party's allegations in holding that petitioners' summary judg-
ment motion had properly been denied.3 7 Spencer assert-
ed that inadequate parking in the petitioners' lot prompted
customers to use the adjacent vacant lot.' Evidence ex-
isted indicating that the petitioners did nothing to discourage
this use of the lot and, thus, at least passively encouraged
it. '3 In addition, the petitioners had the non-exclusive
right, granted in its lease, to use the vacant lot for customer
parking and as an ingress and egress for its employees."'
Referring back to the Johnston decision, the court reasoned
that to the extent that greater parking capacity increased
sales, the store realized a commercial benefit from the use of
the lot.' Finally, evidence that the store and the surround-
ing area was a hang-out for local juveniles was known. 14
2
The store manager would frequently order loitering juveniles
senting).
135. Id. at 727, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
136. Id. at 726, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
137. Southland v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. App. 3d 656, 663, 250 Cal. Rptr.
57, 60 (1988).
138. Id. at 666-67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
139. Id. at 667, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
140. See supra note 54 ant accompanying text.
141. Southland, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 667, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 63.
142. Id. at 667, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 63.
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to leave and would call the police to enforce this re-
quest.
4
The petitioners' summary judgment motion was based
on two arguments: 1) that they had no ownership, posses-
sion, or control over the vacant lot, and 2) that as a matter
of law the injury was not foreseeable. 1" In reaching its de-
cision, the Southland court cited the long-established rule that
a business proprietor has a duty of care to prevent criminal
attacks on invitees while they are on his premises. 145 The
court outlined, but did not specifically apply, the Rowland
policy considerations.1 4' Finally, the court detailed the
Schwartz definition of premises, and approved of the Schwartz
court's recognition that, in defining the scope of premises,
"the critical issue is control," but that "the exercise of control
is not necessarily confined to those premises which are owned
or possessed by the defendant." 47 The Southland court thus
established that the existence of a business proprietor's duty
of care to patrons injured by the criminal acts of third per-
sons on adjacent premises would "depend upon the
proprietor's actual or apparent control of the adjacent proper-
ty . .. "148
Clearly, the court accepted Spencer's argument that be-
cause the petitioners "had the power to control loitering on
the lot by unsavory individuals,"'49 a triable issue of fact ex-
isted which was sufficient to bring the case to the jury:
"Spencer asserts that a defendant 'may owe a duty to pa-
trons "off the business premises" when circumstances causing
the injury are within the range of the defendants' reasonable
supervision and control.""' 5 Even though the Southland
143. Id. at 662, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 60.
144. Id. This two-staged argument was an attempt to establish that, in contrast
to Schwartz, the injury here did not occur on the petitioner's premises, and, unlike
Isaacs, even if it did occur on the petitioner's premises, the injury was not foresee-
able.
145. Id. at 663, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 60 (quoting Peterson v. San Francisco Com-
munity College Dist., 36 Cal. 3d 799, 807, 685 P.2d 1193, 1197, 205 Cal. Rptr.
842, 846 (1984)).
146. Id. at 664, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 60.
147. Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Ltd., 67 Cal. 2d 232, 239-40, 430 P.2d 68, 75,
60 Cal. Rptr. 510, 517 (1967).
148. Southland v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. App. 3d 656, 662, 250 Cal. Rptr.
57, 60 (1988).
149. Id. at 664, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
150. Id. at 665, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
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court accepted the argument, rejected in Donnell, that the
duty of care extended beyond the property line to all areas
which Southland had the power to control, it did not disagree
with the Donnell decision.' Rather, the court cited Donnell,
Steinmetz, Nevarez, and Owens as examples of cases where,
it was clear that the defendant did not and could not
exercise control over the property where plaintiff sus-
tained injury. While the conduct of third persons might
have been foreseeable, defendant's clear lack of control
made it impossible to have instituted preventive mea-
sures. Thus, where the absence of control has been un-
equivocally established, no basis for finding a duty or im-
posing liability exists. 5
The Southland court adopted the definition of control which
equates control with the power to institute preventive mea-
sures, but failed to see that this existed in Donnell because
the school had the ability to install lights on its building.
The Southland court's statement that the defendant in
Donnell had a clear lack of control, making it impossible for
the school to institute preventive measures, is inconsistent
with the Southland court's analysis of the facts. If the
Southland court accepted Spencer's argument that the
petitioners' power to control the loitering on the adjacent lot
was a sufficient basis for the finding of a duty of care, then
how could it agree with the Donnell court's assertion that the
school's ability to illuminate the adjacent sidewalk did not
constitute control over the sidewalk? The Southland court's
silence on this point, and its acceptance of the Donnell hold-
ing on the facts of that case, leaves the definition of control
unclear.
Concededly, factors were present in the Southland case
which were not in Donnell. The fact that in the past the store
manager had endeavored to remove loitering juveniles from
the store area was important. The court indicated that this
exercise of control in the past was strong evidence of the
petitioner's ability to institute preventive measures.'5  How-
ever, the court also indicated that the petitioner's power to
affect the condition of the adjacent property was an indepen-
151. Id. at 666, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 62..
152. Id. at 665-66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
153. Southland, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 666-67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 62-63.
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dent basis for its decision.'54 This casts the reasoning of
the Southland court in stark contrast to that of the Donnell
court.
The important distinction between Donnell and Southland
is that the Southland court recognized the importance of
letting a jury resolve the issues of whether the defendant's
owed a duty of care to the plaintiff and whether the defen-
dant breached this duty. The Donnell court was all too willing
to invade the province of the jury by narrowly defining what
actions could constitute control over the adjacent property.
This shows a severe lack of confidence in a jury's ability to
assess liability using the reasonableness standard. In addition,
the court's failure to consider the policy considerations un-
derlying its decision leaves the impression that the response
of the court was merely subjective. If so, the court failed to
heed the Schwartz court's warning that "just as we may not
rely upon our private judgment on this issue, so the trial
court may not impose its private judgment upon a situation,
such as this, in which reasonable minds may differ."'55
IV. PROPOSAL: INJECT A REASONABLE MAN STANDARD INTO
THE SCIWARTZ DEFINITION OF PREMISES
Courts should utilize the Schwartz definition of premises
in assessing liability for injury on land. As the Southland
court recognized, the importance of the Schwartz decision is
its recognition of a landowner's ability to affect the condition
of land which he does not own or possess.'56 In order to
adequately compensate the victims of violent crime, all those
who had the reasonable ability to remedy a dangerous condi-
tion on land, but failed to so remedy, should be held liable.
The Donnell court was not entirely correct when it stat-
ed:
The existing standard for premises liability, based on
ownership, possession or control, provides predictability.
and reasonably clear limits. Such limits on premises
liablity are also consistent with the general policy under-
lying much of tort law. Although persons may be liable
154. Id. at 669, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
155. Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Ltd., 67 Cal. 2d 232, 244, 430 P.2d 68, 76, 60
Cal. Rptr. 510, 518 (1967).
156. Southland, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 665 n.6, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 61 n.6.
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for injuries occurring under various circumstances on
property under their control or for actively putting oth-
ers in peril elsewhere, absent specific statutory require-
ments persons generally have no duty (and indeed often
no right) to attempt to prevent .any possible injury which
may occur on another's property.
157
If the Donnell court's version of control were modified to
include a landowner's ability to influence the condition of
land, this would then be an accurate statement. Only then
would the standard for premises liability provide predict-
ability and clear limits. Currently, however, a landowner
could not be expected to know which areas of adjacent land
for which he could be held responsible.
As one court has recognized, one who possesses the
power to act should have a duty "to take reasonable precau-
tions to protect the other one from assaults by third parties
which, at least, could reasonably have been anticipated."
158
In imposing this duty to act, a court should look to the fol-
lowing three factors:
1) The degree of power and control the landowner has
over the welfare of his business invitees. The inquiry would
focus on the landowner's ability to remedy the dangerous
condition of adjacent property and be limited by the tradi-
tional reasonableness standard of tort law.
2) The extent to which the business invitee has surren-
dered himself to the proprietor's protection. This considers
whether the proprietor holds the only means of remedying
the dangerous condition, as in Southland, or whether the
means of protection are jointly held by the invitee and the
proprietor.
3) Whether the injury was foreseeable. In considering
this factor, the court should utilize the Isaacs test of foresee-
ability5 9 in order to bring the assessment of liablity for in-
jury from criminal acts of third parties on adjacent property
into line with the assessment of liability for injury from crim-
inal acts within the landowner's property line.
157. Donnell v. Western California School of Law, 200 Cal. App. 3d 715, 726,
246 Cal. Rptr. 199, 205 (1988).
158. Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 483
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
159. Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal. 3d 112, 695 P.2d 653, 211
Cal. Rptr. 356 (1985).
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In addition, the court should apply the Rowland policy
considerations to the facts of each case to determine whether
a duty of care exists between a landowner and business invi-
tee. If all courts used these standards to assess liability for
injury from the criminal acts of third parties on adjacent
property, this area of tort law would be uniform and predict-
able. Business landowners would have a clear indication of
the scope of their duty to invitees. At the same time, the
victims of violent crime would have adequate compensation
from those who contributed to their injuries. Finally, the area
of premises liability would align itself with the legislative
policy expressed in California Civil Code section 1714, which
states in pertinent part that "everyone is responsible . . . for
an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care
or skill in the management of his property or per-
son 160
V. CONCLUSION
The current state of premises liability for injuries from
the criminal acts of third parties on adjacent land remains
unresolved in California. Certain courts have used the
Schwartz definition of premises to extend liability to all areas
over which the landowner has control. 6' However, even
those decisions which use this definition of premises have
been vague in further defining the meaning of "control."6 '
As a result, ambiguities remain with regard to the circum-
stances in which a landowner may be held liable for injuries
to his business invitees from criminal attacks on adjacent
property.
This uncertainty would be resolved if courts considering
the question of landowner liability apply a standard defini-
tion of premises. This definition should be a product of the
Schwartz definition of premises' 63 and the Donnell dissent's
definition of control. 6 4 The court's use of this definition in
160. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1985).
161. Southland v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. App. 3d 656, 250 Cal. Rptr. 57
(1988).
162. Id. at 665, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
163. Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Ltd., 67 Cal. 2d 232, 239, 430 P.2d 68, 72-73,
60 Cal. Rptr. 510, 514-15 (1967).
164. Donnell v. California Western School of Law, 200 Cal. App. 3d 715, 727,
246 Cal. Rptr. 199, 221 (Weiner, J., dissenting).
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assessing liability would ensure that landowners are held re-
sponsible for all areas which they have the reasonable, ability
to influence or affect. Only then will the ambiguous ap-
proach :used in the past by the California courts in assessing
premises liability be remedied.
Margaret j Hurley
